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Abstract 
 
In Psychoanalysis, its image and its public (PIP) Moscovici introduced the theory 
of social representations and took further the project of rehabilitating common 
sense. In this paper I examine this project through a consideration of the problem 
of cognitive polyphasia, and the continuity and discontinuity between different 
systems of knowing. Focusing on the relations between science and common 
sense. I ask why, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the scientific 
imagination tends to deny its relation to common sense and believe that can 
displace it. I argue that the psychosocial dynamic between common sense and 
science is revealing of how heavily they are entangled in, and indeed indebted to 
each other. Even more, this dynamic allows for a full appreciation of what the 
theory of social representations calls states of cognitive polyphasia. Different 
systems of thinking and knowing do not displace each other but live side by side, 
co-existing in a variety of ways, fulfilling different functions and answering 
different needs in social life. 
 
Keywords: social representations, common sense, science, cognitive polyphasia, 
psychoanalysis, everyday life.   
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Introduction 
 
In 1924 Otto Rank spoke before an audience at the New School for Social 
Research about psychoanalysis as a cultural factor (Rank, 1996). He argued that 
Freud’s genius consisted in demonstrating the continuum between the 
psychopathological and what is ‘natural and human everywhere’. He pointed to 
the applicability of psychoanalysis to ‘vigorous life’ and went on to say that it had 
“a closer relation to the content of folk beliefs and popular traditions than to dry 
doctrine, and so it has never lost contact with reality” (Rank, 1996:85). Some 30 
years later a social psychologist working in France set out to study and to 
demonstrate in a systematic and detailed manner how psychoanalysis meets 
‘vigorous life’, enters the public sphere and becomes a cultural factor. The result 
was a book that went on to become a classic in the social psychology of 
knowledge and the original foundation for the theory of social representations. It 
is a book that brings to the fore the continuum between life and knowledge, 
between science and common sense, between a psychology of rationality and 
cognition and a psychology of experience, emotion and society.  
 
Psychoanalysis, its image and its public (from now on PIP) is a book about 
Freud’s theory in the public sphere and about how one form of knowledge, 
psychoanalysis, becomes another, common sense. It is exemplary of Moscovici’s 
aims towards social psychology, of what it should and it could be. Indeed in it we 
find all the elements that make it not only a study on the social psychology of 
knowledge but also the point of departure for a social psychological perspective 
that actively seeks to address the more general questions being posed by the 
social sciences as a whole. What are the relations between science and common 
sense, how does social knowledge evolve as it moves between different social 
contexts and is appropriated by different social actors, how do emotional and 
social forces shape systems of knowing? These are just some of the central 
questions permeating the book as it unravels the trajectory of psychoanalysis in 
the public sphere. None of these questions has aged. They are still central to 
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social scientific inquiry and remain, to a large extent, unresolved theoretical 
problems.   
 
The appearance of PIP in English some fifty years after its publication in France 
gives us the opportunity to readdress some of the questions Moscovici 
introduced then and position them in a historical context. It also gives us the 
chance to juxtapose Moscovici and Freud and consider some of the underlying 
issues that even though neither addressed explicitly can be explored further 
using theoretical resources offered by both. Freud and Moscovici are at one 
when it comes to the problem of continuity and discontinuity in apparently 
disparate, oppositional phenomena. Each in their own way dealt with the co-
existence of opposites and the relational nature of all reality. They rejected the 
view that common sense and folk beliefs are a lesser form of knowledge that at 
some point should be overcome by a more dignified and superior form of 
knowing, which in our contemporary world happens to be science. On the 
contrary, they engaged with everyday thinking and sought to understand how it 
operates in our psychological and social lives. Whereas neither Moscovici nor 
Freud would deny science and rationality, both challenged the sovereignty of the 
rational subject and pointed to the antinomies embedded in human reason.  
 
In fact Moscovici and Freud were fascinated by both the rational and the irrational 
and actively sought the line of continuity between the objective, cold and succinct 
laws of a cognitive outlook capable of dispassionately understanding the world, 
and the subjective, hot and erratic dynamics of human passion, imposing 
disorder and capturing the world by feeling and imagination.  If anything I would 
say that they wished for a wiser reason and an emancipated emotional life, each 
able to engage and establish a dialogue with its other, so that both reason and 
emotion could face the various and multiple reasons each tends to deny. Freud 
pointed to the unconscious as our double, our ‘other’ side; Moscovici pointed to 
common sense, as the unrelenting undercurrent of science, its doppelgänger, its 
denied other. But both views contain more than catches the eye, for the 
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unconscious and common sense are not just the ‘other’ of reason and science. 
They require understanding in their own right and this can only come from the 
permanent and reciprocal pathways that make the continuities and discontinuities 
between all of these phenomena. 
 
In this paper I reflect on these issues addressing the problem of continuity and 
discontinuity between different systems of knowing through a consideration of the 
inter-relations between common sense and science. I ask why, despite 
considerable evidence to the contrary, the scientific imagination tends to deny its 
relation to common sense and believe that can displace it. I argue that the 
psychosocial dynamic between common sense and science is revealing of how 
heavily science and common sense are entangled in, and indeed indebted to, 
each other. Even more, this dynamic allows for an appreciation of the insight 
Moscovici introduced in PIP about cognitive polyphasia. Different systems of 
thinking and knowing do not displace each other but live side by side, co-existing 
in a variety of ways, fulfilling different functions and answering different needs in 
social life. This assumption can both illuminate the empirical study of encounters 
between knowledge systems in the contemporary world and perhaps even more 
importantly, the very epistemology of social representations and its overall 
conception of human thinking (see Marková, this issue).  
 
The Battle between Science and Common Sense  
 
In a recent personal communication Moscovici pointed out that all the key issues 
of our thinking tradition in one guise or another collapse into two major and inter-
related themes: the first is the opposition between philosophy (as high thinking) 
and common sense (as low thinking), the second is the struggle between the 
vanguard/elite and the masses/crowd. Hannah Arendt (1971) calls these 
oppositions the warfare between philosophy and common sense, to be found in a 
line that goes from Plato straight into Kant and Hegel and all the way down to 
more contemporary philosophies and the dynamics of the sciences. The related 
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struggle between the elite and the crowd is found in all political philosophies of 
the West, ranging from Marxism’s dismissal of the masses fully expressed in 
Lenin’s theory of the vanguard, to populist and fascist ideologies, which use the 
masses but conceive of them as childish and ignorant, in a state of perpetual lack. 
Most of these theories, whether in acknowledged form or not, find parallels in Le 
Bon’s study of the crowds and the popular mind (Le Bon, 1982). These issues 
were extensively discussed in Moscovici’s (1985) treatise on mass psychology.  
Indeed to my mind it is not accidental that he identifies these as major themes. 
His own work can be read as an attempt to deal with the oppositions described 
above. This is clearly the case in PIP but it is equally important in the work 
dedicated to the psychology of crowds and active minorities where he seeks to 
understand how ordinary people operating as a minority can make a difference 
and change societies and cultures. 
 
The battles between science and common sense and between ordinary people 
and elites are magnificently exposed by Hannah Arendt in her study on the life of 
the mind (Arendt, 1971). There she shows how deeply the thought of 
philosophers has struggled with the world of common sense and how they 
recurrently considered withdrawal from the world an imperative for the exercise of 
reason. The cleavage between thinking and ordinary everyday common sense is 
deep and widespread. As she remarks, “the whole history of philosophy, which 
tells us so much about the objects of thought and so little about the process of 
thinking and the experiences of the thinking ego, is shot through with an 
intramural warfare between man’s common sense, this sixth sense that fits our 
five senses into the world, and man’s faculty of thought and need of reason, 
which determine him to remove himself for considerable periods from 
it“ (1971:81).  
 
In her observation two issues are salient: the problem of nominalisation (see 
Billig, this issue; Marková, this issue) which separates thought from its 
connection with situated thinking practices, and the rejection of everyday social 
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life as a potential source of enlightenment and reason. Philosophers have 
recurrently detached thought from thinking processes and the experiences of the 
thinking self so that an idealised, and disconnected, form of thought could 
emerge. Thought becomes an abstraction, a solipsistic practice carried out by an 
individual removed from the world, a highly individualised practice. In this process 
thought is opposed to ordinary everyday life; indeed everyday life does not 
comport thinking and in order to think properly the philosopher must withdraw 
from the world. Through a painstaking examination of philosophical conceptions 
of thinking and common sense Arendt shows the extent of the separation 
between thinking and the world of everyday life. It is common sense that 
concerns itself with the latter; thought is only preoccupied with itself. Arendt 
shows that this antecedes by far the modern era; in fact the Cartesian cogito is 
just another instance of a much older Western tradition that requires for thought 
an attitude of detachment from the world. Contemplation reserves to itself the 
higher ground and all the critical capacities of an observer who can afford the 
perspective of a non-participant. Involvement with a life that must be lived is not 
in the realm of the philosopher; lived experience and its demands of full 
immersion in the everyday necessities of biological, social and cultural pains are 
left to common sense.   
 
It is thus common sense that must sustain a human life and indeed the survival of 
the species – not to mention the survival of the philosopher. Not accidently then 
that it is called by many languages the good sense. The notion of common sense 
is very old, being a direct translation from the Latin sensus communis, which in 
its turn translates more or less directly from the Greek koinos nous (Lewis, 1960).  
From Aristotle throughout the medieval tradition sensus communis appeared 
strongly tied up to notions of inter-subjectivity and commonality uniting the 
faculties of understanding and imagination. Medieval anatomists, whose early 
explorations of the brain were firmly entangled in philosophical assumptions, 
positioned sensus communis in one of the three chambers of the brain next to 
the intellect, the imaginative capacities and the memory (Bennet and Hacker, 
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2002). Leonardo da Vinci’s drawing of a skull depicts the sensus communis as 
the very seat of the soul (Da Vinci, 1482). The Islamic medical philosopher 
Avicenas saw it as a cerebral ventricle together with the faculty of fantasy and 
imagination (Davidson, 1992). Later, philosophers of the modern era cut off the 
connection between sensus communis and the brain but continued to indicate its 
being a sense of and for community. Arendt (1971: 50) observes that “what since 
Tomas Aquinas we call common sense, the sensus communis, is a kind of sixth 
sense needed to keep my five senses together and fit the sensations of my 
private senses into a common world of shared others”. In this definition she is 
already pointing to Kant who spoke of sensus communis as an extra sense 
shared by all – like an extra mental capacity – that fits us into a community and 
facilitates communicative understanding by linking each one of us to the lives of 
others and the social world. Such definitions are also compatible with the Scottish 
school of common sense philosophy, whose hidden influence in the making of 
critical psychology Billig has recently dissected (Billig, 2008).   
 
Common sense is thus conceived as shared understanding, a ‘sense’ that 
transcends the individual mind and belongs to the community. However, 
notwithstanding its positive connotations as belonging to all and allowing 
understanding, any sense that belongs to the community and is common to all is 
surely to be somehow problematic. The modern age, but not only the modern 
age, has displayed great resistance to the idea of communities of thought, which 
is better left to the individual (Jovchelovitch, forthcoming). Lewis’ (1960) 
illuminating and amusing study on words captures well the ambivalence of this 
construction. Lewis refers to the various positive and negative meanings of 
common sense, showing how they come and go in unexpected and deeply 
connected ways, so that a very positive meaning turns into something quite 
negative as the mood of the day changes. He shows that the semantic 
connections between sense and reason are complex enough but it is the 
ambivalence of the word ‘common’ that exercises its pressure in the way we 
understand common sense. It is this ambivalence that “permits what may be 
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called a maximising or a minimising of that sense (or reason) that is common to 
all men. On the one hand, because it is universal, cutting across all frontiers and 
surviving in all epochs, it may be reverenced. On the other, if it is as common as 
that – like having two legs and a nose in your face – it can’t be anything very 
wonderful” (Lewis, 1960:153-4).      
 
It is the ambivalence of common sense that interests us here and contributes to 
our understanding of the warfare in which it is entangled. What is common and 
shared is at once valued and devalued, desired and vulgar. A sense that is 
common to all expresses a wisdom that can be easily trapped by the distortions 
and illusions of the popular mind, whose difficulties lie in its lack of reflexivity and 
thinking because of the social influence it is under. Collectives do not think, at 
most they possess a sense because thinking properly so called is reserved for 
individuals. What is common, and thus social, is antithetic to thinking. The link 
between the social, the communal, the abnormal and the deluded are too well 
known in psychology and cannot be addressed here. But there is no doubt that 
this link is also to be found in the ambivalence of common sense. Here we are 
back to the separation between thinking and common sense, between the 
individual and the masses, between the elite and the crowd. Individuals and elites 
think, the masses and the community draw on common sense and from this 
semantic (and political) perspective there is no meeting point between the two. 
 
However, it is important to re-state the ambivalence of the construction. This 
ambivalence fuels the contradictions of modern rationality and the very roots of 
all psychologies including those of critical inclination. Billig’s recent exploration of 
the historical roots of critical psychology shows that individualist conceptions of 
cognition and knowledge developed hand in hand with social ones. In retrieving 
the work of Scottish philosophers Shaftesbury and Reid on common sense and 
assessing how deeply it was entangled with the work of Locke, it becomes clear 
to us that ambivalence between high and low thinking and between the individual 
and the social are present from the start.  Billig helps us to see that the warfare 
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between philosophy and common sense was not a unified, homogenous matter. 
Common sense, the sensus communis, is the feeling humans have for their 
community, a sense that is perhaps the most important of all senses. But is not 
seen as such by all:  “Common sense, or sense of community, lies at the heart of 
human nature. This itself is common sense (or plain, good sense), known to all 
except religious bigots or individualist philosophers (whose cool, intellectual 
theories conflict with the good sense of ordinary people)” (Billig, 2008:106). This 
conflict continues to live in the contemporary battles between science and the 
knowledge of everyday life. I turn to it next. 
 
Can common sense think? 
 
Moscovici’s study of psychoanalysis developed in an intellectual context very 
much shaped by the battles between science and common sense. Concern with 
what happens to scientific knowledge once it enters the semantic universes of 
ordinary people guided what in France and other Latin countries was called the 
process of ‘vulgarisation’ or ‘popularisation’ of science. This corresponds 
approximately to the field of public understanding of science in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. The use of the word vulgarisation in the sixties was not accidental; 
vulgarisation refers to a process of disqualification and loss of credentials. The 
word ‘popularization’ is equally detrimental. Moscovici notes in PIP that “the very 
word popularization has a pejorative meaning and arouses opposition” (2008: 49), 
with many informants directly associating popularization and distortion. This view 
of popularization as distortion was well established in the French public sphere of 
the fifties and sixties, in the thinking of both scientists and lay people. It is 
tempting to think that this view has been undermined by recent developments in 
the social sciences, but the prevalence and relative dominance of the ‘deficit 
model’ (Hilgartner, 1990; Schiele and Jacobi, 1988) for theorizing the diffusion of 
scientific thinking shows that it has not.  
 
 11 
As most intellectuals of his generation in France, Moscovici worked and wrote 
under the impact of Marxism and the deep suspicions it held in relation to 
psychoanalysis, common sense and any kind of ‘mental’, ‘idealistic’ construction. 
Marx’s assessment of ideology as a camera obscura – a system of ideas that 
distorts reality by turning them upside-down to serve the interests of the dominant 
class – informed the view that the common sense of ordinary people reproduces 
the ideas of people at the top and fails to see reality as it is. In a slightly but not 
altogether dissimilar form the assumption of common sense as error and 
distortion influenced a great deal of psychological research. Concerns with what 
Piaget called the ‘education of reason’ (Piaget, 1995) were directed to 
investigations on how human thought progresses from primitive to higher forms 
and ascends to a rationality that can displace the emotional and social elements 
expressed in lay thinking. The education of reason was seen as a linear process 
of progress, where human reason moves from lower to higher systems of 
thinking expressed ultimately by science. The Vygotskyan research programme, 
albeit not as explicit as Piaget's, sustained a very similar concern with the 
education of reason. Soviet psychologists were testing the hypothesis that 
socialism was to produce a society based on science, capable of leaving behind 
myth, superstition, belief and common sense (Luria, 1931). In comparing the 
knowledge of peasants in Central Asia, considered to be the bearers of irrational 
and backward beliefs, to the new rational subject produced by the novel societal 
conditions of socialism, they sought to demonstrate how social engineering of 
one particular kind could transform common sense into science (Jovchelovitch, 
2007).  
 
This was the intellectual atmosphere in which studies of vulgarization and 
popularization took place. The goal was to assess the extent to which science 
could be ‘extended’ – in Freire’s sense of transportation from one community to 
another – to the lay public and yet retain its integrity and avoid distortion 
(Barbichon and Moscovici, 1965; Dulong and Ackermann, 1972; Jacques and 
Raichvarg, 1991). The view of transportation, of extension, of transference was 
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recurrent then and it has not lost its appeal today. Indeed the study of common 
sense continues to be permeated by an attitude of suspicion that systematically 
deprives it of epistemological status and often equates it with distortion, bias, 
error and ignorance. Within psychology, but not only in psychology, there is a 
strong tendency to consider lay knowledge and everyday understandings as 
obstacles, noise, and errors to be removed: the superstitions, mythologies and 
false beliefs they carry should be replaced with the truth of expert or scientific 
knowledge. Entire fields of research and intervention are based on this 
assumption. Health educational programs, for instance, tend to operate with the 
assumption that lay beliefs have to be removed and replaced with scientific 
knowledge (Campbell, 2003). Development interventions have equally treated 
local knowledge as an obstacle to the aims of progress and technical 
achievement (Escobar, 1995). And the whole idea of public understanding of 
science has been based on the assumption that the public must be educated and 
taught to understand scientific theories ‘correctly’ (Wynne, 1995).  
 
Behind all these efforts is the underlying premise that be it the public, be it the 
locals or be it lay people, they all must abandon their existing common sense 
beliefs and ascend to the superior form of knowing offered by experts, 
technocrats and scientists.  
 
Common Sense and the Scientific Imagination 
 
The devaluation of common sense goes hand in hand with the modern tendency 
to glorify science and to conceive it as the source of true knowledge, 
technological innovation and human progress (Bauer, forthcoming). These are 
two sides of a single process that inaugurates one system of knowing as 
preponderant and superior and by the same token defines all others as inferior 
stages in a scale of development. We know that much of this impetus came from 
the trajectory of the scientific imagination since the Enlightenment and in 
particular from the utopias of the first half of the 20th century, when science was 
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powerfully connected to projects of understanding and change both for self and 
for society. Science was conceived as a liberating system of knowing, the only 
one that could give us reality as it is and therefore be therapeutic at the level of 
the subject and emancipatory at the level of society. However, as discussed 
above, this impetus also expresses, although buried in a much longer past, the 
uncoupling of thought and everyday life and the belief that critical capacities and 
progress necessitate a reason detached from its own living context.   
 
Freud and Moscovici shared this legacy and did not completely escape from the 
pressures of the scientific imagination. In fact I would say they were part of it and 
actively reinforced it, albeit in different moments and in a highly ambivalent way. 
This is exemplarily articulated by Freud in The Future of an Illusion, where he 
triumphantly declares “no, science is not an illusion. But an illusion it would be to 
suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere” (1927: p.241). 
Yet, Freud went in search of illusions and so did Moscovici. Freud’s theoretical 
edifice was constructed step by step on the basis of taking seriously the world of 
culture and common sense. Freud listened to his patients as no doctor did in his 
day, and scandalously enough allowed their lay words enter into his theories (see 
Billig, this issue). Jahoda argues that “throughout his working life he [Freud] was 
concerned with assembling confirmation to the idea of closeness of opposites. 
He found it in folk wisdom, in myth and fairy tales (the ugly frog turned into the 
beautiful prince), in legend and poetry, in primitive ritual, but above all in 
language with its remnant of primitive thought” (1977:44-5).  Moscovici took a 
very similar route. He considered the struggle of ideas in the public sphere and 
the structure of everyday thinking as related to science but not necessarily 
subordinated to it; he saw these as highly expressive phenomena to be 
understood in their own right, systems of knowing akin to Winnicottian potential 
spaces where identities are formed, worldviews take shape and traditions are 
perpetuated and challenged. They cannot, and should not, be reduced to science. 
In fact, they constitute science and can be found at the very origins of science.   
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These assumptions have now been largely demonstrated, even if not fully 
incorporated into practices and accepted by researchers. Marková (this issue) 
shows how scientists operate within epistemological environments that, 
searching for certainty and unchangeable universals, preclude new ideas in 
science. Yet the evidence amassed by studies on the public understanding of 
science has shown convincingly that ordinary people invest science with ideas, 
values and meanings that are linked to their social and psychological contexts 
(Farr, 1993; Hilgartner, 1990; Wynne, 1989). And so do scientists. Even though 
Moscovici’s main goal in PIP was to map the transformation of science into 
common sense, the original study opened up a new platform for researchers 
interested in doing precisely the opposite. This is clearly the case in Bauer and 
Gaskell’s research on biotechnology in the public sphere (Bauer and Gaskell, 
2002; Gaskel and Bauer, 2001) which constitutes a comprehensive theoretical 
and empirical examination of how common sense resists, reframes and 
eventually reconstitutes science, co-creating scientific agendas and establishing 
the basis of a common language in both scientific theories and fields of 
application. The extent to which Moscovici’s original programme has inspired this 
large international comparison has been elaborated in detail by the authors in the 
pages of this journal (see Bauer and Gaskell, 1999; and Bauer and Gaskell, this 
issue). Likewise research on social studies of science teaches us that there is an 
intimate connection between the institutional and reified world of the lab and the 
informal, consensual world of everyday life and common sense (Knorr-Cetina 
and Mulkay, 1983; Latour, 1987). Whereas the two-way exchanges between 
science and common sense are now beyond doubt, this was less so in the mid-
fifties and certainly not so at the beginning of the 20th century when the sciences, 
and in particular the human and social sciences, were fighting hard for their 
epistemological credentials.  
 
Psychoanalysis, its Image and its Public tried to capture precisely the exchanges 
between science and common sense by showing how representations of 
psychoanalysis in the public sphere went far beyond the idea and practice of 
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psychoanalysis described in books and held by its professional practitioners. But 
rather than seeing it as distortion and vulgarisation, Moscovici saw the process 
as an expression of what happens to knowledge systems when they move from 
one context to another through communication and social exchanges. Moscovici 
juxtaposed to the idea of vulgarisation, the view that contexts of reception 
actively appropriate the symbolic materials they receive. The appropriations and 
social transformation of psychoanalytic knowledge expressed the symbolic and 
social dimensions of all knowledge, its sensitivity to local contexts and debunked 
the idea of transfer and extension. As in Freire (1973), communication rather 
than extension was the key to understand the transformation of knowledges.  
  
In addition, and perhaps even more radically, Moscovici’s study postulated the 
wisdom of common sense and its irreducibility to any other knowledge system 
(see Jesuino Correa, this issue). Only a historical perspective allows us to 
understand just how daring this is and how fully it is related to what Duveen 
(2000) has called Moscovici’s social psychological imagination. What Moscovici 
is rejecting here is the long and deep-seated cleavage between thought and the 
common sense of everyday life. Communities can think and understanding how 
they do it is a pivotal task (Jovchelovitch, forthcoming). Studying social 
representations of psychoanalysis meant going counter to the spirit of the times 
and to the ethos of bringing the commonsensical knowledge of ordinary people to 
the higher stage of true knowledge, i.e., science. The everyday, he showed, is a 
powerful source of knowledge; it may be a different type of knowledge than 
scientific and technological knowledge, but no less wise in the “know-hows” and 
“know-whys” it contains. What may look irrational, or wrong to the observer 
makes sense to the actors of knowledge, and it is also, if not only, in this sense 
that a knowledge system must be assessed: in relation to the significance and 
psychological reality it has for those who actually produce it and use it. Besides, 
ideas are generative in social life, as much as economic and “material processes”, 
and with Weber, Moscovici understood the “power of the idea” (Moscovici, 1993; 
Duveen, 2000).  
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In this sense and from the very beginning the theory of social representations 
militates against the view that everyday knowledge is distortion and error. It 
seeks to recover the epistemological status of common sense knowledges and 
‘to understand the understandings’ they express, the functions they fulfill and the 
human needs they address. This is perhaps one of the most important lessons 
that comes out of research in the social psychology of knowledge: the realization 
that common sense knowledges do not go away for the simple reason that they 
are functional to human life responding to problems and needs that science does 
not, and indeed cannot, respond to. Let me examine this in what follows.   
    
The Lifeworld,  Common Sense and Cognitive Polyphasia 
 
The world of common sense – or the lifeworld, as it was named by the 
phenomenological movement – is our paramount reality, an evolved achievement 
of our species. Common sense, common knowledge, social intelligence, folk 
knowledge, habitus, thinking-as-usual, collective and social representations; all of 
these terms have featured in frameworks that dealt with the problem of what 
constitutes the human and what holds social life together (Durkheim, 1905/1963, 
Gadamer, 1975, Goody, 1998; Heider, 1958; Schutz and Luckman, 1974). In 
Habermas’ (1989) theory of communicative action, the concept of the lifeworld is 
central to define both the context of community and the conditions for all possible 
communication. He characterises the lifeworld as the space where people 
communicate in order to reach understanding and in this process come to 
construct and consolidate the intersubjectively recognised elements of a shared 
understanding about the world. The lifeworld takes shape in language and 
communication and appears as ‘a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken 
convictions that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative 
processes of interpretation’ (Habermas, 1992:124). It refers to the unproblematic 
knowledge that supplements, accompanies and provides the context for 
communicative action: the traditions, the natural languages, the presuppositions 
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and assumptions that govern everyday life. While seeking mutual understanding 
actors engage in processes of communication that do not disappear, but solidify 
in symbolic structures of meaning and understanding that become the common 
sense knowledges of the lifeworld.   
 
This multifaceted and intersubjectively achieved knowledge of the lifeworld 
provides the points of reference, the parameters, the resources against which 
individuals make sense of the world around them, develop the theoretical and 
practical competencies to deal with the everyday and establish the 
communicative relations that allow for the development of bonds of solidarity and 
cooperation. By making possible and facilitating social action, establishing and 
renewing the inter-personal relations that provide the developing child with a 
sense of self and giving to social actors a framework for identity and belonging, 
the common sense knowledges of the lifeworld construct and reconstruct self, 
society and culture. Whereas the common knowledge of communities appears in 
everyday life as a given, as an already-there stock of meanings and resources 
from which community members draw norms, regulations and patterns of 
behaviour, its horizon is also constructed through the experience of life each day. 
The concept of the lifeworld captures well this double character of common 
sense knowledge: of being already there, of providing foundation and ground and 
at the same time of having to be constantly produced and renewed by social 
actors.  
 
Elsewhere I have suggested that the theory of social representations intersects 
with phenomenological traditions in important ways and nowhere more clearly 
than in its approach to everyday life and what in PIP Moscovici called natural 
thinking and common sense (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Social representations are 
per excellence instances of common sense knowledge and the effort to theorise 
and study social representations can be easily placed in the tradition of the 
phenomenology of everyday life. With other neighbouring disciplines, the theory 
shares an interest in bringing to light the structure of worldviews, of beliefs and 
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forms of life that can produce a theory of everyday life and the knowledge it 
produces. This knowledge, which is always plural, is deeply entangled in the 
lifeworld and lived experience of a community, demarcating its frameworks for 
thinking, doing and relating. It is a type of knowledge that has been historically 
questioned; indeed some would not call it knowledge at all. The phenomenology 
of everyday life, however, is concerned precisely with the legitimacy of such 
common sense knowledges and the dimensions they express: identities, 
practices, relationships, cultural traditions and the history of a community. 
 
In this vein, the study of social representations has developed a social 
psychology of common sense that tries to capture its constructive energies and 
fundamental functions in social and psychological lives. Social representational 
theorists point to the historical character of common sense (Moscovici, 2000a; 
2000b), to its socially shared nature evidenced in the role of language and 
communication in its formation (Marková, 2003) and to its centrality in providing 
frames of reference that allow interpretation and orientation in social life (Jodelet, 
2002; Wagner and Hayes, 2005). Current empirical studies in this field are 
amassing evidence and theoretical insight into new exchanges between 
knowledge systems, on the nature of the dialogues shaping representational 
fields in complex public spheres and on the variety of knowledge outcomes being 
produced by these novel conditions.  No single knowledge/public juxtaposion is 
homogenous and straightforward; there are complex mediations between 
different forms of knowing and different publics, with new forms emerging in-
between. Such is the case with what Wagner (2007) has called vernacular 
science knowledge, a widely distributed form of understanding science 
somewhere in-between everyday thinking and scientific literacy. New forms of 
common sense are continuously being produced by the dialogues between 
knowledges, which in turn push back into the parenting knowledge systems 
generating states of cognitive polyphasia in representational fields and provoking 
a psychological, social and historical process of transformation in knowledge.     
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The study of common sense and lifeworlds is thus pointing clearly to the 
variability and plasticity of the knowledge and the thinking of human communities. 
Common sense and the structures of lifeworlds are constantly changing and 
readjusting in novel and complex dialogical relations. Science, religion, common 
sense, beliefs and ideologies to cite just some of the potential forms of 
knowledge do not remain untouched by the inter-group contexts in which they are 
bred and grow (Duveen, 2007). They produce states of cognitive polyphasia, the 
concept first introduced by Moscovici in PIP. Despite having remained for a long 
period buried within the theoretical corpus of social representations, cognitive 
polyphasia is now guiding research theoretically and empirically. The concept 
expresses the plurality of representational fields, where differing, and at times 
conflicting, styles of thinking, meanings and practices co-exist in the same 
individual, institution, group or community. But as Marková argues in this Special 
Issue the concept also refers to an epistemological conception of human thinking. 
It helps us to understand the multiplicity of voices expressed in the language of 
individual speakers and within public spheres. It is a concept that captures the 
inter-subjective, and therefore communicative, nature of all knowledge systems, 
and the heterogeneity and diversity of human communities. As we argued 
elsewhere “it links cognition and knowledge to their social context of production 
and provides the means to theorise how different representations, meanings and 
styles of thinking co-exist in public spheres” (Renedo and Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
 
Polyphasic representational fields are assets from which individuals and 
communities draw the tools, concepts, practices and meanings that enable them 
to cope with the everyday and make sense of what is going on (Jovchelovitch, 
2002, 2007; Renedo and Jovchelovitch, 2007). They are functional to the life of 
communities, for the survival of the species and of course for the survival of the 
thinking philosopher who shares with his fellow human beings the accumulated 
wisdom of the knowledges operating in the lifeworld. Rather than being 
monological in content, cognitive polyphasia in representational fields expresses 
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the dialogical nature of all knowledge systems and the constant networks of inter-
relations that form the experience of life each day.  
 
Return of the Repressed? The Negation of Common Sense and Everyday 
Ideas 
 
It is difficult to understand how, given the foundational role of common sense in 
social and individual lives, it has not been able to preclude the generalised 
derision it elicits. Scientists, in one way or another, continue to be disdainful of 
common sense, considering it as ‘defective knowledge’ that is incapable of 
rejecting the world of appearances and operating counter-intuitively. Seen as the 
work of the masses it is judged as irrational and blind. Einstein, who greatly 
appreciated the importance of daily experience (Einstein, 1983) was still able to 
observe that ‘common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by the age of 
eighteen’. Simone Weil bluntly remarked that ‘collectivities do not think’ and 
Bachelard (2002: 25), speaking of common sense as opinion, noted that ‘opinion 
thinks badly; it does not think but instead translates needs into knowledge”, 
underlined in the original). However, and ironically enough, no computer program 
has ever been able to replicate common sense. That is why even the smartest of 
all computers cannot sustain a basic conversation. Common sense may well 
refer to the obvious and be considered as just a collection of self-evident 
common places but scientists are struggling hard, and until now unsuccessfully, 
to find the key to replicate it (Elio, 2002; Lifschitz, 1990; McCarthy, 1984).  
 
Science therefore tends to deride common sense despite its foundational role, its 
complexity and its capacity for adaptation and change. Even more, as discussed 
above, a great deal of the effort of science is to displace common sense, to raise 
it to the realm of science, to make sure that, as Freud used to say in relation to 
the Id, “where there is common sense there shall be science”. Now the belief that 
science will one day replace its crucial functions and displace common sense is 
in itself a belief amenable for psychological interrogation. Why would science 
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want to do away with common sense, can it ever do without common sense? 
Why the warfare against common sense? What is at stake in its rejection by the 
thinking philosopher, and by the scientist of today?  
 
Let us then, in the manner of Freud, pursue the clinic of the scientific attitude and 
lay bare its unconscious operations. The first psychological operation is the sharp 
division between the scientist and the lay man: we are not alike, we are not the 
same. The second is the devaluation of common sense, the devaluing and 
rejection of the other: common sense thinks badly or does not think, it is error 
and distortion. The third psychological operation that follows is displacement of 
the Other by the I: get rid of common sense and replace it by the one and best 
way of thinking.   In the troubled relation of science to common sense we find the 
combination of a double denial and an underlying illusion of omnipotence: a 
denial of the intelligence, wisdom and necessity of common sense, a denial of 
the role common sense plays in the making of science and the illusion that one 
day science, the one and best knowledge, will replace common sense.   
 
Bronowski analysed the dangers of a mental state characterized by a sharp 
division between the scientist and ordinary people. He notes that “the fact that 
science is there, mysterious, powerful; the fact that people are impressed by it 
but ignorant and helpless – all this seems to me to have contributed to the 
division in our minds. And scientists cannot escape the responsibility for this. 
They have enjoyed acting the mysterious stranger, the powerful voice without 
emotion, the expert and the god” (1960:146). The combination between denial 
and omnipotent wish-fulfillment takes us back to the problem of the doppelgänger, 
which Moscovici presented in PIP and Freud characterised in his study of the 
uncanny. The double as a defense against the fear of annihilation by the Other, 
who is at once like and unlike what I am, who is partly me and partly not-me. The 
rejected Other is, in fact, close to home. For without common sense, without the 
feeling for what is real, without star gazing and the primary perception of 
immediate experience there would be none of science. It was millennia of 
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perceptual speculation and immediate perception that have allowed the 
development of science and its insistency in denying its roots speaks more about 
its own blindness than about that which it tries to disavow. 
 
But why would science seek to do away precisely with that which needs in order 
to know in its own way? It is easy to go back to Freud here and re-establish the 
continuum between science and common sense: underlying the warfare between 
science and common sense is the dream of a human condition free from its own 
grounding in the world, holder of a rationality that would master itself and all 
around it, that in renouncing the stars, the beliefs and mythologies that provide 
comfort and existential grounding, would develop itself as a final transcendental 
ego. So Freud again: the attempt to kill all fathers, so as to become the father; 
the danger of a superman, the dark undercurrent of human reason. 
  
 
From Warfare to Co-existence: Towards Dialogicality and Polyphasia in 
Knowledge 
 
There is of course a problem in juxtaposing science and common sense in the 
way I have done. There is no such a thing as one science and one world of 
common sense (Ryle, 1960). There are many. The dynamics I have tried to 
expose may constitute a large part of the story between science and common 
sense but it is not the only one. The ambivalence I have pointed to has been 
active and there can be no doubt that despite the derision and denial that science 
has bestowed on common sense the frictions and asymmetries between these 
two systems of knowledge and thought have been engines for creativity and 
development.  
 
Scientists and philosophers know this well. As much as Bachelard led us to think 
about the development of scientific knowledge in terms of obstacles, of which 
primary experience and common sense are the most important ones, he himself 
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made clear that science is itself born out of primary experience and common 
sense knowledge (2002). This is also what phenomenology so clearly taught us. 
Before we can even think of possessing knowledge we actually belong:  
belonging, not knowing, is where we all start from. We belong to a culture, to a 
society, to a family, to a historical time and this belonging frames the knowledge 
we construct from the outset. Blumenberg’s (2000) magnificent study on the 
genesis of the Copernican world demonstrates well these assumptions when he 
shows that all the essential preconditions of Copernicus’ work were extra-
scientific, that Copernicus understanding of heavenly bodies was possible 
because he had before him millennia of perceptual immediacy. Our scientific 
knowledge of heavenly bodies has been made possible by the activity of star 
gazing, whose ancestry goes back to the very beginnings of a distinctive human 
form of life. Bachelard’s (1987) study of fire is equally revealing as it makes clear 
that before we know the chemistry of fire we know we should not touch it. Most, if 
not all, cultures have tales of interdiction for children and fire. Moscovici’s 
analysis of the psychology of scientific myths shows that myths are engines for 
creativity and change, that they come out of the communication between science 
and common sense, originate in both realms and produce a polyphasic post-
rational intelligence that expands both reason and common sense (Moscovici, 
1992).    
 
And philosophers too have known this well being aware of how much philosophy 
renounces when withdrawing from the world of common sense. Arendt (1971) 
points to the loss of common sense as a great loss and makes this beautifully 
clear in the two stories she tells about the encounter between the philosopher 
and the layperson. There is the story told by Plato of the peasant Thracian girl 
who explodes in laughter when she sees Thales fall into a well while watching the 
motions of heavenly bodies above him. Taken by laugher she declares that “he 
was eager to know the things in the sky but what was just at his feet escaped 
him”. Much later Kant, and probably unaware of Plato’s story of the Thracian girl 
tells a similar tale about the Danish astronomer Tycho de Brahe and his 
 24 
coachman. In trying to find their way during a night journey the astronomer 
proposes that they should follow the stars he so well knew, to which the 
coachman replies: “My dear sir, you may know a lot about heavenly bodies, but 
here on earth you are a fool.” In the warfare between high thinking and common 
sense there has been disdain and laughter both ways.  
 
So what for the dream of science without common sense, of cognition without 
culture, of thinking without everyday life? It is surely more desire than fact; but a 
desire to be reckoned with, given its power to frame our perception and self-
understanding. And yet, whatever the power of this dream, common sense 
persists and will persist for the simple reason that it fulfills essential functions of 
survival and responds to human needs that no other system of knowing can 
address. As Habermas recently pointed out “the scientific theories which intrude 
upon the lifeworld do not touch on the framework of our everyday knowledge, 
which is linked to the self-understanding of speakers and actors. No science will 
relieve common sense, even if scientifically informed, of the task of forming a 
judgement” (2003:108) Because of all this common sense holds it ground and 
insists in its perspective. 
 
There is no need of creating a sharp divide between the worlds of science and 
common sense, nor of trying to see them exactly alike. They are different and in 
this difference resides the great potential of all human knowledge. This difference 
is made of continuities and discontinuities. There is a line that separates and a 
line that unites the pheasant Thracian girl and Thales, Tycho and his coachman. 
What unites them is a continuation in knowledge, the remarkable plasticity which 
humans display in processes of knowledge construction, a knowledge continuum 
that does not erase one knowledge with another but is polyphasic and combines 
both cognition and emotion, abstract thinking and action, philosophy and 
pragmatics, science and common sense. It is a knowledge continuum that shows 
how accomplishments in knowledge grow out of, without necessarily invalidating 
other moments and contexts of human experience. In the social psychology of 
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representations we call it cognitive polyphasia, the co-existence rather than 
displacement of knowledge systems. 
 
Situating thought and knowledge, linking cognition and life, putting reason in its 
place: this is the main lesson that I take from the writings of Serge Moscovici; to 
seek an understanding of how humans construct a symbolic landscape that is 
capable of functioning both as science and as common sense, as a reality-setter 
and as a reality opener, of giving us accuracy in cognition and at the same time 
disregarding it altogether so that the human imagination can fly, and in this fly re-
set what we call science, imploding and violating its boundaries to produce 
previously unimagined and unrealised scenarios. As Blumemberg has remarked: 
what a fragile balance between the indispensable and the sublime.   
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